Balancing the Scales of Justice for Pro Se Homeowners

Posts by Simonee

Recording the Notice of Default – DO NOT LET THE BANKS TWIST THIS TO THEIR BENEFIT!

Posted by on Jul 6, 2012 | 0 comments

This is an interesting case in which the homeowner alleged that the Notice of Default was filed by someone other than the note holder because the Note cannot be assigned through the Deed of Trust; and the NOD was filed by the Trustee prior to the Trustee’s Substitution – both arguments FAILED with the Court of Appeals and the Plaintiff (property owner) lost.

Debrunner v. Deutsche Bank  Cal.App. 6th Dist. (H036379) 3/16/12  (click here for Debrunner_v_DeutscheBank)

TRUSTEE’S SALES: The court upheld the trial court’s grant of a demurrer in favor of the lender without leave to amend, holding:

1. Since each assignment of deed of trust provided for the assignment “together with the note or notes therein described”, it was not necessary to separately endorse the promissory note.
2. Physical possession of the note is not a precondition to nonjudicial foreclosure.
3. A notice of default does not need to be filed by the person holding the note. C.C. 2924(a)(1) permits a notice of default to be filed by the “trustee, mortgagee or beneficiary, or any of their authorized agents”.
4. A notice of default (NOD) is valid even though the substitution of the trustee identified in the NOD is not recorded until after the NOD records.

It is true that the Notice of Default can be filed by the “trustee, mortgagee, or beneficiary or any of their authorized agents”  – but  according to Calif. Civil Code Section 2936 only the holder of the Note has the right to foreclose. Kelley v Upshaw (1952) 39 C2d 179.  Meaning that while the Servicer or Trustee or one of their “agents” can file the Notice of Default, the Note Holder and ONLY the Note holder can incur the default upon which it then issues a “declaration of default” upon which to invoke the “power of sale”.   In this matter, the assignments of Deed of Trust apparently were done by the entities that held BOTH documents.

At this time Chiu was already a trustor on a first deed of trust on the property,     having borrowed $975,000 from Quick Loan Funding, Inc. (Quick Loan) in June 2004.   The trustee named on that deed of trust was Chicago Title Company. The following month Quick Loan assigned the deed of trust and Chiu’s promissory note to Option One Mortgage Corporation (Option One), which shortly thereafter assigned both interests to FV-1, Inc.

The final assignment of the deed of trust was from FV-1 to Deutsche Bank, with respondent Saxon Mortgage Services, Inc. (Saxon) acting as “Attorney in Fact.” This document  bore three dates:     September 2,2008, when the assignment was originally executed; September 21, 2009, when it was notarized; and January 5, 2010, when it     was recorded.

The Court of Appeals held that because the Deed of Trust assignments claim to assign the Deed of Trust ALONG  with the Note – that the assignment was valid and the Note need not be endorsed!?  To understand this logic one first must read the path of assignments as outlined by the Court in the complaint.

(Interesting that the Court did not comment on nor was there any discussion that the document was notarized 19 days after it was signed/executed!)

The Court found that the assignment assigned beneficial interest in both the Deed and the Note:

Because those assignments conveyed     all beneficial interest in     the deed of trust, “[t]ogether with     the note or notes therein described or referred to,” a chain of     title had been established on     the face of     the first amended     complaint.

Now this is what I find fascinating about this, many homeowners have MERS named on their Deeds of Trust; but not on their Promissory Note.  I can see the banks using this ruling (because it is published) as a basis to argue that the Note can be assigned with the Deed of Trust.    But is that really true?  If MERS (or any entity assigning the Deed of Trust) is NOT named on the Promissory Note and does not possess the Note as a “holder” how could they assign the Note?

MERS often purports to assign the Note and Deed of Trust, however if MERS does NOT own the Note and/or is not named on the Note, it CANNOT assign the Note and MERS assignment of the Deed of Trust to a new entity separate from the Note  is of no force and effect.  As the United States Supreme Court so clearly explained 140 years ago:

The Note and mortgage are inseparable; the former is essential, the latter as an incident.  An assignment of the Note carries the mortgage with it; while an assignment of the latter alone is a nullity.  Carpenter v. Longan, 83 U.S. 271, 274 (1871)

 This basic proposition has been reaffirmed.  National Live Stock Bank v. First Nat’l Bank, 203 U.S. 296/ 306 (1906); Kirby Lumber Co. v. Williams, 230 F.2d 330, 336 (5th Cir. 1956); In reVeal, 450 B.R. 897, 916-17 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2011); In re Vargas, 396 B.R. 511, 516 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2008); In re Leisure Time Sports, Inc., 194 B.R. 859, 861 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1996); Bellistri v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 284 S.W.3d 619, 623 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 2009).

If the holder of the deed of trust does not own or hold the note, the deed of trust serves no purpose, is impotent, and cannot be a vehicle for depriving the grantor of the deed of trust of ownership or the property described in the deed of trust.  The sole purpose of the deed of trust is to secure payment of the Note.

The very, and sole, purpose of a foreclosure sale pursuant to the deed of trust is to obtain funds for payment of the note.  If the holder of the deed of trust does not own or hold the note, and there were to be a foreclosure under the deed of trust, there is no assurance that the proceeds of the foreclosure would be used for the purpose intended by the deed of trust, i.e. to be applied to payment of, or on, the note.  That is not to say that the owner or holder of the note cannot arrange for an agent or nominee, acting on its behalf, to conduct a foreclosure for the benefit of owner or holder of the note.  But that is quite a different proposition from assertions that the holder of the deed of trust who does not own the note or hold the note has the power to transfer the note from the original note holder to another and that an entity that does not own or hold the note can conduct a foreclosure under a deed of trust.

Civil Code §2936  has always held that the transferee of the note will prevail over the transferee of the mortgage, and is the only one entitled to foreclose (See Adler v Sargent (1895) 109 Cal. 42, 41 P. 799, 41 P. 2d 799); being assignee of the deed of trust from MERS does not seem to accomplish much when that assignee is not the holder of the financial interest in the note. MERS v Saunders (2010) 2 A3d 289.)  see also Restatement (3d) of Property (Mortgages) § 5.4[“[a] mortgage may be enforced only by, or in behalf of, a person who is entitled to enforce the obligation that the mortgage secures.”)

The only entity with the right to order a foreclosure is the holder in due course of the promissory note — no one else. Kelley v Upshaw (1952) 39 C2d 179.

I think it is important to recognize how YOUR situation may be different from this Plaintiff’s situation; do NOT assume that an assignment of the Deed of Trust can and does actually assign the Promissory Note, making an endorsement unnecessary.

As I get more feedback and updates on this ruling will be sure to share them with you!

 

KEEP UP THE FIGHT!

Simonee

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Unlawful Detainer Wins/Losses

Posted by on Jul 5, 2012 | 0 comments

The Unlawful Detainer stage is probably the most scary, frustrating experience in this whole fraudclosure debacle.  Having said that, some homeowners are winning but many are losing.  But with each win, with each loss, I learn a little more about what it will take to get the Court to FOLLOW THE LAW.

 San Diego Win – Demurrer

In this UD the homeowner filed a Demurrer against JP Morgan Chase; the sole basis of the Demurrer was the improper verification of the Complaint by the attorney when JP Morgan Chase had personnel IN the County who could sign the complaint.

The homeowner used a Info To Fight Foreclosure sample Demurrer pleading and had an attorney argue the motion in front of the Court.

1)      The Judge was a “pro-term” judge – it was an attorney acting as a “judge”.    Ethical attorney’s seem to follow the law to the T – versus retired Judges who don’t care about whether their rulings getting overturned or criminal judges who get “stuck” hearing the Case.

2)      The JP Morgan attorneys filed their opposition at the hearing. Their opposition was focused solely on the the “quit/pay” notice, claiming that they had no responsibility to give a prior property owner the opportunity to “pay” instead of quit.  Huh? Had nothing to do with the Demurrer filed by the San Diego homeowner – so this leads me to believe that the attorneys used a “template” at the last minute and had no clue what the Demurrer was about, which left them unprepared to argue the verification issue.

3)      While the judge could not “judicially notice” the exhibits demonstrating the presence of JP Morgan in Los Angeles County, the point was not “lost” on the Judge.  He too questioned why an organization the size of JP Morgan did not have someone who could sign and verify the complaint…so he sustained the Demurrer and gave the Plaintiff 10 days to file the verified complaint.

4)      JP Morgan never filed a verified complaint.  Hmmm…why do you think that is?

Los Angeles Loss – Demurrer

In this UD, which is ongoing, the TENANT filed a Demurrer on the basis that the UD Complaint had been filed a mere 9 days after the Notice  to Vacate had been posted.  The Notice to Vacate was a 3/90 Day Notice.  3 days for the prior property owner and 90 days for all other residents and the fact that the Complaint had been verified by the attorney even though the “new” property owner clearly was in the same county.

California has a statute, CCC § 1161b in which tenants are to be given a minimum of SIXTY days to vacate the property.  (The current tenant is related to the prior property owner and therefore did not qualify for the Federal “Saving Homeowners Act”)   In this matter the new owner had given 90 days, so California law states that the current tenants should have been given the full 90 days prior to any lawsuit being filed.

1)      The tenant demanded a “judge” and refused to have a Commissioner hear the matter.  As a result the matter was removed to a “judges” calendar – the Judge who heard the matter was a “Criminal Judge” who was not familiar with Unlawful Detainers.

2)      The Judge  heard the matter as the LAST hearing of the day.  By the time the tenant was heard the Courtroom was clear of ANY one sitting in the galley, there was no electronic recording nor was there a court reporter.   The Judge ADMITTED to not understanding the UD statutes because she was a “criminal” Judge – and in a classic deference to an attorney and a demonstration of bias towards a pro per the Judge stated, “well they have a ground for the UD so the Demurrer is overruled”;  refusing to acknowledge or deal with the issue of timing of the lawsuit or improper attorney verification.   When I hear these kinds of things I lose a little more respect for Judges.

The tenant then filed a Writ – which was summarily “denied” by the appellate court.

San Diego UD – Stayed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing

In this matter the homeowner first had the Case remanded and consolidated with a Federal Complaint; to which the Plaintiff’s sought and was granted a Motion to Dismiss and the case was remanded back to the UD Court.  Recognizing that the UD Court is a rocket docket forum which rubber stamps the banks fraud, on the morning of the UD hearing the homeowner filed a Chapter 11 which automatically put a stay in place.

What was/is fascinating about this case is that when the UD started the attorney assigned was apparently an associate of the firm.  As the homeowner filed against the UD – both with discovery and with a motion to consolidate it to the Federal Complaint, the UD was moved up the chain of authority within the Plaintiff’s law firm.   By the time the homeowner was scheduled for the UD trial THE senior partner of the firm had taken over responsibility for the case.

It appears, and I would love to hear what other homeowners are experiencing – the Plaintiff’s law firm saw the UD as a ministerial act – a matter of mere paperwork which would not require any real lawyering.  As the homeowner proved that she would not let her home go without a fight, the law firm found that it had to actually pay attention to the case and it required more seasoned, experienced attorneys to oppose the homeowner.   In this case the Plaintiff has the Court on its side because the Court’s allow about 15 minutes for each UD hearing and typically have a timeline of about 45 days from the filing of the UD to the trial, to dispose of the UD.  UD court is an ugly forum to try to be heard and homeowners rights are routinely trodden upon as the UD Court rubber stamps the fraud; but as we are finding, there are ways to be heard.   In this case, the homeowner sought the one sure way to stop the eviction and that was through a Bankruptcy that put in an automatic stay.

There are many more homeowners fighting at this stage of the fraudclosure process.  Some of the issues homeowners are investigating and fighting:

1)      Improper attorney verification –  this is becoming more and more of an issue and as we learn how homeowners are getting the Courts to recognize, RESPECT and APPLY the law…we will share the arguments

2)      Objecting to the Trustee Deed Upon Sale – homeowner aggressively objects to the introduction of the TDUS based on the hearsay recitals and defective Notice of Default

3)      Relating/Consolidating the Case and Getting a Stay against the UD –  filing a Complaint for Wrongful Foreclosure, Improper Trustee Sale, and Quiet Title.   We are seeing homeowners generate UD Killers with properly plead complaints against the fraudclosure.

Paid members – watch for our blog on UD Killers – how to kill the UD and save your home!

Until next time…

 

KEEP UP THE FIGHT!

Simonee

 

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CA – Dismissal reversed when SAC sufficiently pled Violation of 2923.5

Posted by on Jul 5, 2012 | 1 comment

Thanks to Charles Cox, a true homeowner advocate keeping us informed!  Thanks Charles for this exciting and insightful update!  NOTE this is certified for PARTIAL publication….

Skov v. U.S. Bank N.A. (2012) , Cal.App.4th

[No. H036483. Sixth Dist. June 8, 2012.]

ANDREA SKOV, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Defendant and Respondent.

[Opinion Certified For Partial Publication. fn. * ]

(Superior Court of Santa Clara County, No. CV153635, Mark H. Pierce, Judge.)

(Opinion by Mihara, J., with Premo, Acting P. J., and Elia, J., concurring.)

COUNSEL

Holland Law Firm, George Holland, Jr. for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Severson & Werson, Jan T. Chilton, Donald J. Querio and Jason M. Julian for Defendant and Respondent. {Slip Opn. Page 2}

OPINION

MIHARA, J.-

Plaintiff Andrea Skov filed an action against defendant U.S. Bank National Association, as trustee for Credit Suisse First Boston CSFB 2004-AR3 (U.S. Bank), and others in which she alleged improprieties in the nonjudicial foreclosure process involving her residence. fn. 1 The trial court sustained U.S. Bank’s demurrer to the second amended complaint and dismissed the action. Skov contends: (1) the trial court improperly took judicial notice of various recorded documents; and (2) the second amended complaint sufficiently pleaded her causes of action for wrongful foreclosure, unlawful business practices, and declaratory relief. We conclude that the second amended complaint sufficiently pleaded a violation of Civil Code section 2923.5. fn. 2 Accordingly, we reverse the judgment.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In December 2003, Skov obtained a loan of $1.5 million, which was secured by a deed of trust in her residential property in Saratoga. The deed of trust identified Skov as the “Borrower,” Gateway as the “Lender,” Financial Title Company as “Trustee,” and MERS as “acting solely as a nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors and assigns.” MERS is also identified as “the beneficiary under this Security Instrument.” The deed of trust further stated that “Borrower understands and agrees that MERS holds only legal title to the interests granted by the Borrower in this Security Instrument, but, if necessary to comply with law or custom, MERS (as nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors and assigns) has the right: to exercise any or all of those interests, including, but not limited to, the right to foreclose and sell the Property.”

After Skov stopped making payments pursuant to the terms of the promissory note, NDEx, which identified itself as an agent for MERS, served Skov with a notice of default on June 10, 2009. A declaration of compliance with section 2923.5 was recorded with the notice of default. On July 16, 2009, MERS assigned all beneficial interest in the deed of trust to U.S. Bank. On July 20, 2009, U.S. Bank substituted NDEx as trustee for Financial Title Company. On September 18, 2009, NDEx recorded a notice of trustee’s sale, which had been sent to Skov.

On June 10, 2010, Skov filed her second amended complaint and alleged nine causes of action, only three of which are the subject of the present appeal. The first cause of action for wrongful disclosure alleged that there were several improprieties in the assignment, transfer and exercise of the power of sale in the deed of trust. More {Slip Opn. Page 3} specifically, Skov alleged that since U.S. Bank and MERS were not assignees of the original note identified in the deed of trust, they did not have the right to exercise the power of sale contained in the deed of trust, and thus U.S. Bank was not entitled to any debt on the property. It was also alleged that U.S. Bank failed to comply with section 2923.5 “until on or about July 10, 2009.” The eighth cause of action for unlawful business practices (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.) alleged that U.S. Bank failed to comply with section 2923.5 because it did not contact or attempt to contact her to discuss her options to avoid foreclosure prior to filing the notice of default. The ninth cause of action for declaratory and injunctive relief sought a determination of the parties’ legal rights and duties and that the foreclosure of the property be permanently enjoined. Skov also sought compensatory and punitive damages.

U.S. Bank filed a demurrer to the second amended complaint. In support of its demurrer, U.S. Bank requested judicial notice of the deed of trust, the notice of default, the notice of default declaration, the assignment of the deed of trust from MERS to U.S. Bank, the substitution of trustee, and the notice of trustee’s sale. The trial court granted the request for judicial notice, sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, and dismissed the action with prejudice. Skov filed a timely appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

In reviewing an order sustaining a demurrer, ” ‘we examine the complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory, such facts being assumed true for this purpose. [Citations.]’ (McCall v. PacifiCare of Cal., Inc. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 412, 415 [(McCall)].) We may also consider matters that have been judicially noticed. [Citations.]” (Committee for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara County Bd. of Supervisors (2010) 48 Cal.4th 32, 42.) “Generally it is an {Slip Opn. Page 4} abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment. [Citation.]” (Cooper v. Leslie Salt Co. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 627, 636.)

B. fn. * Judicial Notice

Conceding that the trial court could properly take judicial notice of recorded documents, Skov contends it improperly took judicial notice of “the truth, validity and/or legal effect of [U.S. Bank’s] foreclosure documents . . . .” (Capitalization & boldface omitted.)

This issue was recently considered in Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 256(Fontenot). In Fontenot, the complaint sought injunctive relief and damages for wrongful foreclosure, and alleged, among other things, the improper transfers of the promissory note and security. (Id. at p. 261.) In ruling on the defendant’s demurrer to the complaint, the trial court took judicial notice of two deeds of trust, an assignment of a deed of trust, and other documents required by the nonjudicial foreclosure procedure. (Id. at p. 262.)

Fontenot began its analysis by summarizing the principles regarding judicial notice: “We review the trial court’s ruling on the request for judicial notice for abuse of discretion. [Citation.] [¶] ‘ ” ‘Judicial notice is the recognition and acceptance by the court, for use by the trier of fact or by the court, of the existence of a matter of law or fact that is relevant to an issue in the action without requiring formal proof of the matter.’ ” ‘ [Citation.] When ruling on a demurrer, ‘[a] court may take judicial notice of something that cannot reasonably be controverted, even if it negates an express allegation of the pleading.’ [Citation.] Accordingly, Evidence Code section 452, subdivisions (c) and (h), respectively, permit a court, in its discretion, to take judicial notice of ‘[o]fficial acts . . . of any state of the United States’ and ‘[f]acts and propositions that are not reasonably {Slip Opn. Page 5} subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.’ ” (Fontenot, at p. 264.) Reasoning that recordation and use of a notary public in the execution of real property records ensures their reliability, and their maintenance in the recorder’s office enables them to be readily confirmed, Fontenot concluded that “a court may take judicial notice of the fact of a document’s recordation, the date the document was recorded and executed, the parties to the transaction reflected in a recorded document, and the document’s legally operative language, assuming that there is no genuine dispute regarding the document’s authenticity.” (Fontenot, at pp. 264-265.)

Fontenot then rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the trial court improperly took judicial notice of the defendant’s designation as beneficiary in the deed of trust. (Fontenotsupra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 266.) Fontenot explained that the defendant’s “status as beneficiary was not the type of fact that is generally an improper subject of judicial notice . . . since its status was not a matter of fact existing apart from the document itself. Rather, [the defendant] was the beneficiary under the deed of trust because, as a legally operative document, the deed of trust designated [the defendant] as the beneficiary. Given this designation, [the defendant’s] status was not reasonably subject to dispute.” (Ibid.) Accordingly, Fontenot concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion in taking judicial notice of the documents. (Ibid.)

In Fontenot, as in the present case, the plaintiff relied on Mangini v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1994)7 Cal.4th 1057, overruled on other grounds in In re Tobacco Cases II (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1257, 1276,Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1366, and Abernathy Valley, Inc. v. County of Solano (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 42, and argued that the trial court had improperly taken judicial notice of the truth of the contents of the recorded documents. (Fontenotsupra, 198 Cal.App.4th at pp. 266-267.) In Mangini, the court held that judicial notice could not be taken of the {Slip Opn. Page 6} truth of the conclusions in a report issued by the United States Surgeon General or the truth of matters reported in newspaper articles. (Id. at p. 266.) Fontenot distinguished Mangini, pointing out that the documents in that case “were fundamentally informative documents, and the parties sought judicial notice of the facts contained in the documents without demonstrating the facts were ‘not reasonably subject to dispute.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.Fontenot also distinguished Herrera, stating that “the facts of which the trial court here took judicial notice arose from the legal effect of the documents, rather than any statements of fact within them.” (Id. at p. 276.) Fontenot summarily rejected Abernathy, stating that it “appears to differ with the weight of California authority. That case declined to take judicial notice of deeds, judgments, and indentures ‘as evidence of actual conveyances’ because such use would require accepting the ‘truth of the facts stated therein.’ [Citation.] Because its holding is stated in a conclusory manner, the exact reasoning of the decision is unclear, and we do not find it to be persuasive authority in this context.” (Id. at p. 266, fn. 6.)

We agree with the analysis in Fontenot. Thus, we conclude that the trial court properly granted judicial notice of the facts arising from the legal effect of the documents, such as the status of an entity as the beneficiary, trustee, or its agent. However, as we conclude, infra, to the extent that the trial court took judicial notice of any disputed statements of fact contained within these documents, such as whether there was statutory compliance with section 2923.5, it erred.

C. fn. * MERS’s Authority to Initiate Foreclosure

Skov contends that MERS lacked authority to execute the notice of default and the assignment of the deed of trust, and thus each of the foreclosure documents was void. Skov acknowledges that MERS could have properly acted under the deed of trust when such action was “required” and “necessary to comply with law or custom.” However, she {Slip Opn. Page 7} contends that U.S. Bank failed to establish that these two conditions had occurred. We reject her contention.

An assignment of a deed of trust is legally permissible. (§ 2934.) One commentator has acknowledged that such assignments are customary, stating: “Because the lien of the trust deed is merely an incident of the debt, the assignment by endorsement and delivery of the promissory note accomplishes the transfer of the security without the necessity of a formal assignment of the trust deed itself. . . . [¶] The better practice, however, is to assign the mortgage or trust deed also by a formal written document that is duly acknowledged and recorded.” (4 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (3d ed. 2003) § 10.38, fns. omitted & italics added.) Moreover, an assignment of the deed of trust is usually signed by the beneficiary, not the party that the deed of trust identifies as “Lender.” (See 3 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate Forms (2d ed. 2006) § 3.60.) fn. 3 Thus, here, the assignment was executed by MERS rather than Gateway. fn. 4

Similarly, the recordation of a notice of default is required by law. A notice of default must be recorded by the trustee, beneficiary, or an agent of either. (§ 2924, subd. (a)(1).) Thus, NDEx properly signed the notice of default as the agent of MERS, the beneficiary.

Accordingly, statutes and standard legal texts establish that MERS’s execution of the assignment of the deed of trust and its authorization of the notice of default were “required” and “necessary to comply with law or custom.” fn. 5 {Slip Opn. Page 8}

D. Section 2923.5

Skov also contends that the trial court erred in concluding that the declaration of compliance with section 2923.5 conclusively proved such compliance. U.S. Bank argues: (1) the second amended complaint does not allege facts showing noncompliance with section 2923.5; (2) section 2923.5 does not create a private claim of action; and (3) the National Bank Act preempts section 2923.5.

1. Statutory Compliance

Section 2923.5 provides that a mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent must contact the borrower “in person or by telephone in order to assess the borrower’s financial situation and explore options for the borrower to avoid foreclosure” or satisfy due diligence requirements before a notice of default is filed. fn. 6 Section 2923.5 does not {Slip Opn. Page 9} require the lender to modify the loan. (Mabrysupra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 214.) The only remedy for noncompliance with the statute is the postponement of the foreclosure sale. (Ibid.)

Whether a defendant has complied with a statute is a question of fact. (See Daum v. SpineCare Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1285, 1306.) Here, the second amended complaint alleged in relevant part: Skov “was fully available to meet with U.S. Bank” to explore foreclosure options; she hired attorneys or other representatives, who telephoned and sent letters to U.S. Bank which were unanswered; U.S. Bank failed and refused to evaluate her finances, to advise her of her right to meet with U.S. Bank to discuss foreclosure avoidance options, and to give her a HUD telephone number; and U.S. Bank did not comply with the requirements of section 2923.5 because it did not contact her until “on or about July 10, 2009,” which was after it had recorded the notice of default on June 12, 2009. In response, U.S. Bank requested judicial notice of the notice of default declaration that stated that the requirements of section 2923.5 had been met on June 9, 2009. However, whether U.S. Bank complied with section 2923.5 is the type of fact that is reasonably subject to dispute, and thus, not a proper subject of judicial notice. (See Fontentotsupra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 266.)

U.S. Bank also argues that Skov has failed to allege any facts to support her claim. U.S. Bank asserts that her allegation that she was “fully available” to meet with U.S. Bank does not establish noncompliance with section 2923.5, claiming that “despite Skov’s supposed ‘full availability,’ U.S. Bank may have complied with section 2923.5 by attempting, unsuccessfully but in good faith, to contact Skov.” (Italics added.) However, as U.S. Bank’s argument recognizes, it may not have complied with the statutory {Slip Opn. Page 10} requirements. Assuming the truth of Skov’s allegations, the issue of compliance cannot be resolved at this stage of the litigation. (McCallsupra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 415.)

2. Private Right of Action

U.S. Bank next contends that there is no private right of action for noncompliance with section 2923.5. Relying on Lu v. Hawaiian Gardens Casino, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 592 (Lu), U.S. Bank asserts thatMabrysupra185 Cal.App.4th 208, which held to the contrary, was wrongly decided. fn. 7

Lusupra50 Cal.4th 592 considered whether Labor Code section 351, which provides that a gratuity is the sole property of the employee to whom it was given, contains a private right to sue. Relying onMoradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Companies (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287, 305, Lu stated that “whether a party has a right to sue depends on whether the Legislature has ‘manifested an intent to create such a private cause of action’ under the statute. [Citations.]” (Lu, at p. 596.) However, when the statutory language does not “strongly and directly indicate that the Legislature intended to create a private cause of action [citation,]” then courts must examine the legislative history. (Lu, at p. 597.) Turning to the language of Labor Code section 351, Lu noted that it did not expressly state that an employee had a right to bring an action for any violation of the statute. (Lu, at p. 598.) Lu also observed that related statutes provided that an employer who violated Labor Code section 351 was guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to a fine and/or imprisonment, and that the Department of Industrial Relations was charged with enforcement of the statute. (Lu, at p. 598.) After reviewing the legislative history, Luconcluded that there was “no clear indication” that the Legislature intended to create a private right to sue under Labor Code section 351. (Lu, at pp. 598-601.) {Slip Opn. Page 11}

Relying on the Restatement test for determining tort liability for a statutory violation, the plaintiff inLu argued that a private action was implied from the statute. (Lusupra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 601-602.) “The ‘Restatement approach allows the court itself to create a new private right to sue, even if the Legislature never considered creation of such a right if the court is of the opinion that a private right to sue is “appropriate” and “needed.” ‘ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 602.) The plaintiff further argued that this approach was confirmed in Katzberg v. Regents of University of California (2002) 29 Cal.4th 300. (Lu, at p. 602.) Lu rejected the plaintiff’s arguments and distinguished Katzberg on the ground that it involved a private action to remedy a constitutional violation. (Lu, at pp. 602-603.) Lu also noted that there was no language ” ‘expressly entitl[ing] individuals to a refund or any other type of payment for violation of the statute.’ [Citation.]” (Lu, at p. 603, fn. 8.) In response to the plaintiff’s arguments that the Department of Industrial Relations had no authority to recover misappropriated gratuities, Lustated that there were other remedies available to the plaintiff, such as an action for conversion. (Id. at pp. 603-604.)

Here, as in Lu, section 2923.5 does not expressly provide for a private right of action. However, unlike in Lu, there are no statutes which provide either a penalty for noncompliance with section 2923.5 or designate any administrative agency with enforcement of the statute. Moreover, unlike in Lu, there are no other remedies available to a borrower if there is a violation of the statute.

Mabry recognized that “courts . . . do not favor constructions of statutes that render them advisory only, or a dead letter. [Citations]” (Mabrysupra, 185 Cal.App.4th at pp. 218-219.) Mabry next noted that “statutes on the same subject matter or of the same subject should be construed together so that all the parts of the statutory scheme are given effect. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 219.) Mabry then examined section 2924g, subdivision (c)(1), which outlines the grounds for postponing a foreclosure sale, in {Slip Opn. Page 12} conjunction with section 2923.5. “Section 2923.5 and section 2924g, subdivision (c)(1)(A), when read together, establish a natural, logical whole, and one wholly consonant with the Legislature’s intent in enacting 2923.5 to have individual borrowers and lenders ‘assess’ and ‘explore’ alternatives to foreclosure: If section 2923.5 is not complied with, then there is no valid notice of default and, without a valid notice of default, a foreclosure sale cannot proceed. The available, existing remedy is found in the ability of a court in section 2924g, subdivision (c)(1)(A), to postpone the sale until there has been compliance with section 2923.5. Reading section 2923.5 together with section 2924g, subdivision (c)(1)(A) gives section 2923.5 real effect. The alternative would mean that the Legislature conferred a right on individual borrowers in section 2923.5 without any means of enforcing that right.” (Mabry, at pp. 223-224.)

Mabry also considered the legislative history of section 2923.5. (Mabrysupra, 185 Cal.App.4th at pp. 219-220.) Mabry recognized that an early version of section 2923.5 expressly provided for a private right of action, which was not included in the final version, thus suggesting that “the Legislature may not have wanted to have section 2923.5 enforced privately.” (Mabry, at pp. 219-220.) However,Mabry stated that this factor was not dispositive, reasoning that “silence is consonant with the idea that section 2923.5 was the result of a legislative compromise, with each side content to let the courts struggle with the issue.” (Mabry, at p. 220.)

Mabry also observed that “compliance with section 2923.5 is necessarily an individualized process. After all, the details of a borrower’s financial situation and the options open to a particular borrower to avoid foreclosure are going to vary, sometimes widely, from borrower to borrower. . . . [¶] . . . [I]n order to have its obvious goal of forcing parties to communicate (the statutory words are ‘assess’ and ‘explore’) about a borrower’s situation and the options to avoid foreclosure, section 2923.5 necessarily confers an individual right.” (Mabrysupra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 224.) Thus, Mabry {Slip Opn. Page 13} noted that Moradi-Shalal was distinguishable on the ground that the statute in that case “contemplates a frequent or general business practice, and thus its very text is necessarily directed at those who regulate the insurance industry.” (Ibid.)

Mabry concluded that two factors outweighed the Legislature’s dropping of an express provision for a private right of action. (Mabrysupra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 225.) “First, the very structure of section 2923.5 is inherently individual. That fact strongly suggests a legislative intention to allow individual enforcement of the statute. The statute would become a meaningless dead letter if no individual enforcement were allowed: It would mean that the Legislature created an inherently individual right and decided there was no remedy at all. [¶] Second, when section 2923.5 was enacted as an urgency measure, there already was an existing enforcement mechanism at hand–section 2924g. There was no need to write a provision into section 2923.5 allowing a borrower to obtain a postponement of a foreclosure sale, since such a remedy was already present in section 2924g.” (Ibid.) Given that Lu is distinguishable from the present case, we find the analysis in Mabry persuasive. Accordingly, we conclude that the Legislature intended to allow a private right of action under section 2923.5.

3. Preemption

U.S. Bank also contends that the National Bank Act (12 U.S.C. § 21 et seq.) preempts section 2923.5.

The National Bank Act “vests national banks . . . with authority to exercise ‘all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking.’ (12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh).) Real estate lending is expressly designated as part of the business of banking. (12 U.S.C. § 371(a).) [¶] As the agency charged with administering the [National Bank] Act, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (‘OCC’) has the primary responsibility for the surveillance of the ‘business of banking’ authorized by the Act. [Citation.] To carry out this responsibility, the OCC has the {Slip Opn. Page 14} power to promulgate regulations and to use its rulemaking authority to define the ‘incidental powers’ of national banks beyond those specifically enumerated in the statute. [Citations.] OCC regulations possess the same preemptive effect as the Act itself. [Citation.]” (Martinez v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc. (9th Cir. 2010) 598 F.3d 549, 555.)

The OCC regulations, which outline the powers of national banks, include 12 Code of Federal Regulations § 34.4, subdivision (a). It provides that “state laws that obstruct, impair, or condition a national bank’s ability to fully exercise its Federally authorized real estate lending powers do not apply to national banks.” More specifically, “a national bank may make real estate loans . . . without regard to state law limitations concerning . . . [p]rocessing, origination, servicing, sale or purchase of, or investment or participation in, mortgages.” (12 C.F.R. § 34.4, subd. (a)(10).) However, “[s]tate laws on the following subjects are not inconsistent with the real estate lending powers of national banks and apply to national banks to the extent that they only incidentally affect the exercise of national banks’ real estate lending powers: [¶] . . . [¶] . . . Acquisition and transfer of real property.” (12 C.F.R. § 34.4, subd. (b)(6).)

Mabrysupra185 Cal.App.4th 208 held that 12 Code of Federal Regulations section 560.2, subdivision (b)(10), which is the Office of Thrift Supervision’s parallel regulation under the Home Owners’ Loan Act, fn. 8 did not preempt section 2923.5. As does 12 Code of Federal Regulation section 34.4, this regulation sets forth which matters are regulated by federal law and which matters are left to state regulation. (Mabry, at pp. 228-229.) State laws, including “[r]eal property law,” are not preempted “to the extent that they only incidentally affect the lending operations of Federal saving associations . . . .” (12 C.F.R. section 560.2 (c)(2).) Mabry reasoned: “[T]he process of foreclosure {Slip Opn. Page 15} has traditionally been a matter of state real property law, a point noted both by the United States Supreme Court in BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1994) 511 U.S. 531, 541-542, and academic commentators (e.g., Alexander, Federal Intervention in Real Estate Finance: Preemption and Common Law (1993) 71 N.C. L.Rev. 293, [‘Historically, real property law has been the exclusive domain of the states.’ (italics omitted)]), including at least one law professor who laments that diverse state foreclosure laws tend to hinder efforts to achieve banking stability at the national level. (See Nelson, Confronting the Mortgage Meltdown: A Brief for the Federalization of State Mortgage Foreclosure Law (2010) 37 Pepp. L.Rev. 583, 588-590 [noting that mortgage foreclosure law varies from state to state, and advocating federalization of mortgage foreclosure law].) By contrast, we have not been cited to anything in the federal regulations that governs such things as initiation of foreclosure, notice of foreclosure sales, allowable times until foreclosure, or redemption periods. (Though there are commentators, like Professor Nelson, who argue there should be.) [¶] Given the traditional state control over mortgage foreclosure laws, it is logical to conclude that if the Office of Thrift Supervision wanted to include foreclosure as within the preempted category of loan servicing, it would have been explicit. Nothing prevented the office from simply adding the words ‘foreclosure of’ to Regs. section 560.2(b)(10).” (Mabry, at pp. 230-231, fn. omitted.)

U.S. Bank argues that “[w]hile a state law governing foreclosure procedure may not be preempted, section 2923.5 is not such a law.” As Mabry noted, however, ” ‘the States have created diverse networks of judicially and legislatively crafted rules governing the foreclosure process, to achieve what each of them considers the proper balance between the needs of lenders and borrowers. . . . [A]bout half of the States also permit foreclosure by exercising a private power of sale provided in the mortgage documents. . . . Foreclosure laws typically require notice to the defaulting borrower, a {Slip Opn. Page 16} substantial lead time before the commencement of foreclosure proceedings, publication of a notice of sale, and strict adherence to prescribed bidding rules and auction procedures. . . . (BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp.supra, 511 U.S. at pp. 541-542)’ ” (Mabrysupra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 230, fn. 17.) By requiring a lender to contact a borrower prior to filing a notice of default to “assess” his financial situation and to “explore” options to avoid foreclosure, section 2923.5 merely sets forth one of the steps in foreclosure proceedings. Moreover, given that section 2923.5 does not require the lender to modify the loan and a lender’s failure to comply with the statute is limited to providing borrowers with more time, it only incidentally affects the lending operations of a bank. fn. 9

U.S. Bank claims that section 2923.5 “seeks to compel loan modifications as a means of avoiding foreclosures and curbing high foreclosure rates, mandates specific disclosures to borrowers, and requires burdensome reviews of borrower financials and proposed loan modifications” thus regulating “loan servicing and processing . . . .” As Mabry pointed out, however, section 2923.5 must be very narrowly construed to avoid federal preemption. (Mabrysupra, 185 Cal.App.4th at pp. 231-232.) Section 2923.5 does not require the lender “to consider a whole new loan application or take detailed {Slip Opn. Page 17} loan application information” from the borrower. (Mabry, at p. 232.) Moreover, the exploration of options to avoid foreclosure “must necessarily be limited to merely telling the borrower the traditional ways that foreclosure can be avoided (e.g., deeds ‘in lieu,’ workouts, or short sales), as distinct from requiring the lender to engage in a process that would be functionally indistinguishable from taking a loan application in the first place.” (Ibid.) We find Mabry’s analysis convincing. Thus, since the federal regulation of national banks is essentially the same as that of federal savings association, we conclude that section 2923.5 is not preempted by federal law.

In sum, there is a factual issue as to whether there was compliance with the requirements of section 2923.5 prior to the filing of the notice of default. Accordingly, the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer.

III. DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

Premo, Acting P. J., and Elia, J., concurred.

FN *. Under California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(c), 8.110, and 8.1120, only the Introduction, sections I, IIA, IID, and III are certified for publication..

FN 1. Defendants Gateway Bank, FSB (Gateway), Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), NDEx West, L.L.C. (NDEx), Tariq Alsami, and Money Loan Financial Services, Inc. are not involved in this appeal.

FN 2. All further statutory references are to the Civil Code unless otherwise stated.

FN *. See footnote, ante, page 1.

FN *. See footnote, ante, page 1.

FN 3. This court may judicially notice statutes (Evid. Code, § 451, subd. (a)) and “[f]acts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy,” such as standard legal texts. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (h).)

FN 4. Since MERS properly executed the assignment to U.S. Bank, U.S. Bank could then properly substitute NDEx as trustee. (See § 2934a, subd. (a)(1).)

FN 5. Since we conclude that MERS was authorized to assign the deed of trust and commence foreclosure, we need not consider U.S. Bank’s alternative contention that Skov’s claim “fails for the added reason that she does not allege she tendered payment of the sums owing under her promissory note.” However, we note that Mabry v. Superior Court (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 208 (Mabry) held that a borrower need not tender the full amount of indebtedness prior to seeking to enjoin a foreclosure sale for violations of section 2923.5. (Mabry, at pp. 225-226.)

FN 6. Section 2923.5 states in relevant part: “(a)(1) A mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent may not file a notice of default pursuant to Section 2924 until 30 days after initial contact is made as required by paragraph (2) or 30 days after satisfying the due diligence requirements as described in subdivision (g). [¶] (2) A mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall contact the borrower in person or by telephone in order to assess the borrower’s financial situation and explore options for the borrower to avoid foreclosure. During the initial contact, the mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall advise the borrower that he or she has the right to request a subsequent meeting and, if requested, the mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall schedule the meeting to occur within 14 days. The assessment of the borrower’s financial situation and discussion of options may occur during the first contact, or at the subsequent meeting scheduled for that purpose. In either case, the borrower shall be provided the toll-free telephone number made available by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to find a HUD-certified housing counseling agency. Any meeting may occur telephonically. [¶] (b) A notice of default filed pursuant to Section 2924 shall include a declaration that the mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent has contacted the borrower, has tried with due diligence to contact the borrower as required by this section, or that no contact was required pursuant to subdivision (h).” A notice of default may also be filed when the borrower has not been contacted if such failure occurred despite the due diligence of the mortgagee, beneficiary, or agent. (§ 2923.5, subd. (g).) Section 2923.5 defines “due diligence.” (§ 2923.5, subd. (g).)

FN 7. The California Supreme Court denied review in Mabrysupra185 Cal.App.4th 208 nine days after it filed Lusupra50 Cal.4th 592.

FN 8. The Home Owners’ Loan Act preempts state law regarding the “[p]rocessing, origination, servicing, sale or purchase of, or investment or participation in, mortgages.” (12 C.F.R. § 560.2, subd. (b)(10).)

FN 9. One federal district court has held that section 2923.5 is preempted by the National Bank Act. (Acosta v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (N.D.Cal., May 21, 2010, No. C 10-991 JF (PVT)) [2010 WL 2077209].) Others have reached the same result under the Home Owner’s Loan Act. (Gonzalez v. Alliance Bancorp (N.D.Cal., Apr. 19, 2010, No. C 10-00805 RS) [2010 WL 1575963]; Murillo v. Lehman Bros. Bank FSB (N.D.Cal., July 17, 2009, No. C 09-00500 JW) [2009 WL 2160578]; Odinma v. Aurora Loan Services (N.D.Cal., Mar. 23, 2010, No. C 09-4674 EDL) [2010 WL 1199886]; Parcay v. Shea Mortg., Inc. (E.D.Cal., Apr. 23, 2010, No. CV-F-09-1942 OWW/GSA) [2010 WL 1659369];Quintero Family Trust v. OneWest Bank, F.S.B. (S.D.Cal., Jun. 25, 2010, No. 09-CV-1561-IEG (WVG)) [2010 WL 2618729]; DeLeon v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (N.D.Cal. 2010) 729 F.Supp.2d 1119.) These cases reason that section 2923.5 is preempted by federal law because it involves the processing and servicing of the plaintiffs’ mortgages. This court is not bound by the decisions of lower federal courts interpreting federal law. (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 190.)

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Dr. Graves is at it again with this insightful Tidbit – How to Argue with Judges!

Posted by on Jul 5, 2012 | 1 comment

Dr. Graves is the author of “Jurisdictionary” – a 24 hour crash course on understanding the law and civil procedures for pursuing a lawsuit (either as a Plaintiff or Defendant).  As a user of the course I get his insightful emails on a regular basis and this one has a clever analogy that all of us can relate to!  If you are a pro per, or a homeowner pursuing accountability of the parties involved in your Fraudclosure with an attorney, then investing in this program is a MUST DO.   The key ingredient in winning is knowing YOUR RIGHTS and how to pursue them.

Click here to order your copy of Jurisdictionary®

*******

Arguing with judges is like arguing with baseball umpires.

You better know the rules AND HOW TO USE THEM!

Here are a few rules from the Official MLB Rulebook:

  • A player is not permitted to step or go into a dugout      to make a catch.
  • A player is permitted to reach into a dugout to make a      catch.
  • If a player makes a catch outside the dugout and his      momentum carries him into the dugout, the catch is allowed as long as the      player does not fall in the dugout.

Simple enough?

But!

What if the players and the coaches on one team don’t know the rules?

What happens then?

Will it do that team any good to argue with the umpire?

Probably not!

And all the %#$@&* will only get you thrown out of the park and possibly grounded for the season!

To argue successfully with a baseball umpire or a judge on his bench in the courtroom, you must know the Rules of Court … and how how to use them to your advantage!                        

It’s the bottom of the ninth. Two down. Batter at the plate. The count is three and two. The batter pops a high foul. You push back your catcher’s mask and dash toward the dugout to make the catch. The ball hits your glove and you trip on the rim of the dugout and fall in. Scrambling to your feet, you climb back out of the dugout, ball in your upraised hand, triumphant grin on your face.

Teammates cheer.

Fans roar fanatic approval from the stands.

But, the scornful look on the umpire’s face and his raspy voice erase your victorious joy.

“Foul Ball!”

“But, I caught the ball, ump!”

The player strides purposely toward the umpire, waving a fist, yelling obscenities, and spitting (of course).

Fast behind is the coach, marching menacingly toward the umpire, cap shoved back, fists in the air, also shouting nasties and accusing the umpire of needing a new pair of glasses.

The umpire stands firmly behind the plate, hands planted on his hips, and waits for the verbal onslaught.

“I caught the foul ball. It’s an out!”

“It’s a foul ball. Period!” the umpire insists.

“You must be blind, Ump! It’s an out! Game’s over. We win! You saw me catch the ball? Jeeter couldn’t do any better!”

“Maybe not,” the umpire insists, “but Jeeter knows the ground rules! You fell in the dugout. Catch doesn’t count. Get back behind the plate where you belong!”

“But. But. But.”

If you studied my affordable 24-hour Jurisdictionary lawsuit self-help course, you know that all the “buts” in the world won’t do you a bit of good in court!

Claiming you’re pro se and should be allowed to play by different rules won’t help, either!

You either learn the rules – and how to use them to your advantage OR YOU LOSE!

Sending emails to friends after you lose or posting hateful comments on the internet complaining “All our courts are corrupt” just marks you as a loser.

Learn the official rules and how to use them … or lose!

You can show up in court with all kinds of documents and things that you think are “admissible evidence”. You can know the law is on your side.

But!

If you don’t know the rules of evidence and rules of procedure – and how to use them to your advantage you lose!

There will be times when you’ll need to argue with the judge about this or that, but do yourself a favor and discover what I learned practicing law in state and federal courts since 1986: unless you know the rules and how to argue the rules effectively, you have no more chance of changing a judge’s ruling than the catcher who snags a foul ball in mid-air while falling into the dugout!

The Rules RULE!

End of story!

Losers believe internet fables. Losers get their legal education at the barbershop or on websites or expensive weekend seminars run by people who never practiced law, never went to law school, and don’t know mud from sand about the rules of court or how to use them to advantage.

Too many good folks believe mythological silver-bullet easy solutions to their legal problems. As a predictable result, they are losing … when they could be winning!

A host of wannabe legal gurus infest the internet and barbershops with half-baked schemes that sound too good to be true … and, like the old adage says, “If it sounds to good to be true, it probably isn’t.”

You may have heard people claiming you can win by challenging a judge’s oath of office, insisting a UCC lien can be used to create collateral for borrowers, insisting banks don’t loan “real money”, or that you can deny your citizenship and claim to be a “sovereign human being” above the law.

It might work in small claims or traffic court … but it will not carry the day for you in any kind of serious lawsuit or criminal case.

Hope in one hand and spit in the other. See which hand gets wet.

Learn how to use the rules!

It’s not expensive, and people who have my course tell us an 8th grader can learn it all in a single weekend.

If you have a lawyer, you’ll save thousands in legal fees by knowing what the lawyer should be doing … and you’ll maximize your chances for success by making certain the lawyer does what should be done, instead of taking you for a ride to the poorhouse – as happens to so many good people these days.

If you don’t have a lawyer, you’ll know how to stop the opponent’s crooked tricks and get the judge on your side!

The key is knowing the rules and how to use them!

To learn more, go to: Jurisdictionary®

 

 

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SHERIFF ANNOUNCES CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATION

Posted by on Jul 3, 2012 | 1 comment

Thank you to Charles Cox and Foreclosure Hamlet for sharing the followiing.

The Sheriff for Carroll County New Hampshire, High Sheriff Christopher Conley has announced an investigation regarding mortgage fraud. I have attached the Press Release below, you can click on the link:

Mortg%20Fraud%20TF%20Docs%20070212.pdf  or click here:  Sherriff Invesitgates Fraud

Hopefully other Sheriffs around the country will follow in his footsteps. I would encourage everyone to share this Press Release with their Sheriff and demand that they also start an investigation into the mortgage fraud, and send an email or call the Carroll County Sheriff and give him your support.

 

 

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